Filter-feeders
Last night, sitting with friends around the TV, I found myself in a conversation the thrust of which was that Quakers are not simply a commercial organisation obsessed with oat-based cereal products. I know that this is not the case, because I attended a Quaker school at which there was remarkably little oat-oriented activity in evidence.
Whilst not a Quaker myself, I did develop an enduring admiration for at least one aspect of Quaker life: the Quaker meeting and more specifically the appreciation of silence. Quakers, you see, are fond of sitting in groups in silence. We used to sit for an hour in silence every Thursday morning - all three hundred of us. We would regularly attend similar meetings on a Sunday, and before every meal and morning assembly for a few quiet minutes.
The silence was not enforced - if you were 'moved' to stand up and say something you could. And people sometimes did. Quite often we would sit in a circle.
Sitting in contemplative silence in this way is something which very few people do these days, and something of which very few people are capable. I am confident that this is the case because I used to ask groups of psychology students to sit for twenty minutes in silence. Some described it as one of the most difficult experiences of their course - they would laugh, fidget, pull faces and eventually become angry and frustrated.
The point is, quite simply, that this kind of silence forces one to learn to live with oneself: to become aware of oneself and to enter into dialogue with oneself.
Every day I travel to and from work on the train, and this is perhaps the most noticeable feature - that people cannot endure themselves. Instead they are absorbed in a variety of distractions ranging through i-pods and blackberries to trashy novels and portable DVD players.
It was this observation that helped me unravel Baudrillard's rhetorical question: 'Will computers take us back to a material, inhuman form of intelligence?' - a question which I took initially to be nonsensical, but which I now interpret in the following light: technology, in providing us with a constant source of external stimulus makes us less self-aware, less self-conscious. In a real sense we become more animalistic - creatures caught in an endless series of stimulus-response loops of increasing complexity. Sitting at a series of screens responding to email messages may seem like higher order behaviour - but in fact leaves very little room for genuine reflection.
You might want to take a more forgiving stance and marvel instead at our capacity to process the vast amounts of information to which we are exposed - but it is a hollow boast, I think. I am not a television viewer so I found it strange that as I had the aforementioned conversation the television played loudly in the background. I kept missing out bits of what my friends were saying as my attention was drawn to the screen - or more accurately to the commentary.
And then I noticed that they suffered no such effects - they had developed the ability to allow this information simply to 'wash over' them. So I think it is most accurate to say that we are becoming a society of filter-feeders - like jellyfish mindlessly sifting through vast amounts of information for the odd tasty morsel. The only highly-developed capability here is that of taste - we 'lick' our way around the information superhighway. Something tasty and we post it on our blog. I think bees do this.
Which brings me back to oats. Did you know they do them in small pre-flavoured, microwaveable packets now?
Thursday, February 15, 2007
Friday, February 09, 2007
Natural aristocracy
Natural aristocracy
Nearing the conclusion of Fukayama's book. One of the things that he sets out to achieve en route to his conclusions res. biotechnology is to establish the foundations on which human rights rest. In other words, why anybody should be entitled to rights at all, and how we should decide - broadly speaking - who is entitled to what.
At the risk of spoiling the ending for you, his answer is that there are certain traits that we share as a species (such as empathy, intelligence, sociability, language etc.) which arouse in us a sense of human dignity which in turn roughly circumscribe the domain of human rights. He is alert to arguments by exception, pointing out that 'typical' traits are only those normally shared (in the sense of a 'normal distribution' or bell curve). Roughly speaking, you get rights that rats don't because you possess these abilities to an unusual extent.
He reminds us that the idea that all humans share these traits is a relatively recent concession - supported in part by scientific evidence to the effect that just because you are, say, female or black does not imply anything about those traits fundamental to one's dignity or rights (so we should not be denied our freedom or the vote on spurious grounds).
Interestingly he reminds us that certain classes of human (such as children, criminals or the insane) are denied such rights on something like this basis; that they do not possess some of the above traits to the requisite degree. Anticipating the next question, Fukayama remarks that as for 'natural aristocracies' (societies in which rights are allocated on an individual basis according to their relevant traits) - there is no objective way to assess such traits so such a system is unworkable in practice. And he moves on.
Sitting across from me on the train is a man reading a paper, the headline of which states that new forms of brain imaging are now able to resolve our very intentions (functional MRI, presumably). And the following occurs to me: we make all manner of assumptions about how rights are distributed between animals, children, the mentally ill, criminals and generally accept these as proper. Fukayama's argument seems almost apologetic in this light. Actually, I don't think it is impossible - or even difficult - to make objective assessments of some of the traits to which Fukayama refers as being the basis for the assignment of rights. Certainly it is becoming much easier.
And on this basis his argument supports an uneven distribution of rights: I picture a world in which, say, the average Sun reader does not have the right to vote - or in which women are more likely to be able to travel freely between states than men. We balk instinctively at such ideas (because of the assumptions mentioned above) - but children, as I say, do not have the right to vote.
Of course, in reality, such a system already exists: rights and freedoms are effectively conferred in unequal measure by one special human ability - the ability to acquire capital.
On a lighter note, for those of you who, like me, are Firefox users if you don't already have 'stumble' it is an amazingly useful add-on: it records your site preferences and throws up sites that may also be of interest (based on similar people's ratings) which, in turn, you rate. The antidote to you-tube.
http://www.stumbleupon.com/
Nearing the conclusion of Fukayama's book. One of the things that he sets out to achieve en route to his conclusions res. biotechnology is to establish the foundations on which human rights rest. In other words, why anybody should be entitled to rights at all, and how we should decide - broadly speaking - who is entitled to what.
At the risk of spoiling the ending for you, his answer is that there are certain traits that we share as a species (such as empathy, intelligence, sociability, language etc.) which arouse in us a sense of human dignity which in turn roughly circumscribe the domain of human rights. He is alert to arguments by exception, pointing out that 'typical' traits are only those normally shared (in the sense of a 'normal distribution' or bell curve). Roughly speaking, you get rights that rats don't because you possess these abilities to an unusual extent.
He reminds us that the idea that all humans share these traits is a relatively recent concession - supported in part by scientific evidence to the effect that just because you are, say, female or black does not imply anything about those traits fundamental to one's dignity or rights (so we should not be denied our freedom or the vote on spurious grounds).
Interestingly he reminds us that certain classes of human (such as children, criminals or the insane) are denied such rights on something like this basis; that they do not possess some of the above traits to the requisite degree. Anticipating the next question, Fukayama remarks that as for 'natural aristocracies' (societies in which rights are allocated on an individual basis according to their relevant traits) - there is no objective way to assess such traits so such a system is unworkable in practice. And he moves on.
Sitting across from me on the train is a man reading a paper, the headline of which states that new forms of brain imaging are now able to resolve our very intentions (functional MRI, presumably). And the following occurs to me: we make all manner of assumptions about how rights are distributed between animals, children, the mentally ill, criminals and generally accept these as proper. Fukayama's argument seems almost apologetic in this light. Actually, I don't think it is impossible - or even difficult - to make objective assessments of some of the traits to which Fukayama refers as being the basis for the assignment of rights. Certainly it is becoming much easier.
And on this basis his argument supports an uneven distribution of rights: I picture a world in which, say, the average Sun reader does not have the right to vote - or in which women are more likely to be able to travel freely between states than men. We balk instinctively at such ideas (because of the assumptions mentioned above) - but children, as I say, do not have the right to vote.
Of course, in reality, such a system already exists: rights and freedoms are effectively conferred in unequal measure by one special human ability - the ability to acquire capital.
On a lighter note, for those of you who, like me, are Firefox users if you don't already have 'stumble' it is an amazingly useful add-on: it records your site preferences and throws up sites that may also be of interest (based on similar people's ratings) which, in turn, you rate. The antidote to you-tube.
http://www.stumbleupon.com/
Thursday, February 01, 2007
Shoes or Weapons - you decide
shoes or weapons - you decide
An interesting weekend: I helped two friends to upload their video to youtubehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bTA4GPQpLq4
and joined 9 million other people in the world's most under-reported conflict - the burning crusade.
It strikes me how perfectly developments in biotechnology and information technology are matched, if Frances Fukuyama is to be believed ('Our Posthuman Future'). According to Fukuyama there are three classes of biotechnology development worthy of our consideration:1) the extension of human lifespan (and the ageing population generally)2) the development and legitimisation of psychoactive drugs (citing prozac and ritalin as examples)3) the dawning ability to genetically engineer (or selectively breed) offspring
- to what end?
Perhaps so that the distractions which our bodies present may be reduced to a bare minimum in the interests of preserving an uninterrupted informational existence: bodies which require little exercise, artificially enhanced concentration and satiety at the expence of reduced sexual appetite and creativity, and all of it spread more thinly over an extended lifespan. But only for the privileged few: Fukuyama's 'Brave New World' widens the gap between the genetic underclass condemned to slave away in the real world and an engineered ruling class, experiencing new degrees of freedom in an informational universe.
I read with interest that the BBC is to open a virtual world for children. I can say with some certainty what the appeal of this environment to many children will be: to be able to manipulate and experiment with one's appearance and explore the reactions of others - in short to develop and refine impression management skills. My elder daughter is a warcraft player and it continues to impress me how central the experience of varying the appearance of characters and selecting their clothing is. But there is an important additional step to the behaviour of the adult players (given that the average player is in their 30's) - the addition of status. Items of appearance are linked to status, and much time is spent acquiring items whose appearance denotes or confers status. This, of course, represents an androcentric bias - in contrast to the BBC's proposals which are predictably shy of permitting the kinds of dominance-oriented activity which have made other virtual worlds so successful. No money, no levels, no weapons. The future of this feminist utopia will be interesting, I think. I can only hope that the creator's of the BBC virtual world have stocked the virtual wardrobes sufficiently. Shoes may well be a deciding factor.
Curiously, this all too human motivation is also at the heart of the Wii design - over the past few months I would estimate that more time has been spent creating, modifying and observing player avatars than in actually playing the games themselves. What is gathering momentum is the tendency of people to identify with their online representation - surely the first step in mass migration - for millions of people the faint realisation that their online existence might be so much more 'liberating' than their physical one.
And this is the curiously predictable oversight of technologists in general - that they overlook the significance of what Fukuyama calls 'human nature' in their designs - that they rhythmically fail to anticipate the impact of instinct: in short that technology provides merely an extrapolation of precisely those actvities being pursued one hundred thousand years ago. Who would have thought, for example, that people would purchase phones with features they are unlikely ever to use - simply because they crave the status associated with the possession of a feature-rich device.
And this is precisely why virtual environments and technological change in general is fascinating - because it is so revealing of human nature. Through it we are able to conduct a kind of 'factor analysis' - spotting in sharp relief those invariants that go to make up the enduring features of our humanity amidst the fluid transitions in our environment. It reminds me of Zimbardo's Stanford Prison experiments of the 70s - in which the renowned psychologist recreated an experimental prison in the basement of Stanford University in the interests of studying the influence of changing roles (prisoner/guard) on human personality. What he discovered was so shocking, so unexpected, that he was forced to end the research prematurely: simply by shifting roles he exposed the dark mechanics of human nature - it's fierce focus on dominance and expediency and the sheer depth of ingroup and outgroup effects - but most of all the flimsy nature of socialisation itself. But I suppose I should have realised that in any case, having been at the BBC for a little while now ;o)
An interesting weekend: I helped two friends to upload their video to youtubehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bTA4GPQpLq4
and joined 9 million other people in the world's most under-reported conflict - the burning crusade.
It strikes me how perfectly developments in biotechnology and information technology are matched, if Frances Fukuyama is to be believed ('Our Posthuman Future'). According to Fukuyama there are three classes of biotechnology development worthy of our consideration:1) the extension of human lifespan (and the ageing population generally)2) the development and legitimisation of psychoactive drugs (citing prozac and ritalin as examples)3) the dawning ability to genetically engineer (or selectively breed) offspring
- to what end?
Perhaps so that the distractions which our bodies present may be reduced to a bare minimum in the interests of preserving an uninterrupted informational existence: bodies which require little exercise, artificially enhanced concentration and satiety at the expence of reduced sexual appetite and creativity, and all of it spread more thinly over an extended lifespan. But only for the privileged few: Fukuyama's 'Brave New World' widens the gap between the genetic underclass condemned to slave away in the real world and an engineered ruling class, experiencing new degrees of freedom in an informational universe.
I read with interest that the BBC is to open a virtual world for children. I can say with some certainty what the appeal of this environment to many children will be: to be able to manipulate and experiment with one's appearance and explore the reactions of others - in short to develop and refine impression management skills. My elder daughter is a warcraft player and it continues to impress me how central the experience of varying the appearance of characters and selecting their clothing is. But there is an important additional step to the behaviour of the adult players (given that the average player is in their 30's) - the addition of status. Items of appearance are linked to status, and much time is spent acquiring items whose appearance denotes or confers status. This, of course, represents an androcentric bias - in contrast to the BBC's proposals which are predictably shy of permitting the kinds of dominance-oriented activity which have made other virtual worlds so successful. No money, no levels, no weapons. The future of this feminist utopia will be interesting, I think. I can only hope that the creator's of the BBC virtual world have stocked the virtual wardrobes sufficiently. Shoes may well be a deciding factor.
Curiously, this all too human motivation is also at the heart of the Wii design - over the past few months I would estimate that more time has been spent creating, modifying and observing player avatars than in actually playing the games themselves. What is gathering momentum is the tendency of people to identify with their online representation - surely the first step in mass migration - for millions of people the faint realisation that their online existence might be so much more 'liberating' than their physical one.
And this is the curiously predictable oversight of technologists in general - that they overlook the significance of what Fukuyama calls 'human nature' in their designs - that they rhythmically fail to anticipate the impact of instinct: in short that technology provides merely an extrapolation of precisely those actvities being pursued one hundred thousand years ago. Who would have thought, for example, that people would purchase phones with features they are unlikely ever to use - simply because they crave the status associated with the possession of a feature-rich device.
And this is precisely why virtual environments and technological change in general is fascinating - because it is so revealing of human nature. Through it we are able to conduct a kind of 'factor analysis' - spotting in sharp relief those invariants that go to make up the enduring features of our humanity amidst the fluid transitions in our environment. It reminds me of Zimbardo's Stanford Prison experiments of the 70s - in which the renowned psychologist recreated an experimental prison in the basement of Stanford University in the interests of studying the influence of changing roles (prisoner/guard) on human personality. What he discovered was so shocking, so unexpected, that he was forced to end the research prematurely: simply by shifting roles he exposed the dark mechanics of human nature - it's fierce focus on dominance and expediency and the sheer depth of ingroup and outgroup effects - but most of all the flimsy nature of socialisation itself. But I suppose I should have realised that in any case, having been at the BBC for a little while now ;o)
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