Friday, February 09, 2007

Natural aristocracy

Natural aristocracy
Nearing the conclusion of Fukayama's book. One of the things that he sets out to achieve en route to his conclusions res. biotechnology is to establish the foundations on which human rights rest. In other words, why anybody should be entitled to rights at all, and how we should decide - broadly speaking - who is entitled to what.


At the risk of spoiling the ending for you, his answer is that there are certain traits that we share as a species (such as empathy, intelligence, sociability, language etc.) which arouse in us a sense of human dignity which in turn roughly circumscribe the domain of human rights. He is alert to arguments by exception, pointing out that 'typical' traits are only those normally shared (in the sense of a 'normal distribution' or bell curve). Roughly speaking, you get rights that rats don't because you possess these abilities to an unusual extent.

He reminds us that the idea that all humans share these traits is a relatively recent concession - supported in part by scientific evidence to the effect that just because you are, say, female or black does not imply anything about those traits fundamental to one's dignity or rights (so we should not be denied our freedom or the vote on spurious grounds).

Interestingly he reminds us that certain classes of human (such as children, criminals or the insane) are denied such rights on something like this basis; that they do not possess some of the above traits to the requisite degree. Anticipating the next question, Fukayama remarks that as for 'natural aristocracies' (societies in which rights are allocated on an individual basis according to their relevant traits) - there is no objective way to assess such traits so such a system is unworkable in practice. And he moves on.

Sitting across from me on the train is a man reading a paper, the headline of which states that new forms of brain imaging are now able to resolve our very intentions (functional MRI, presumably). And the following occurs to me: we make all manner of assumptions about how rights are distributed between animals, children, the mentally ill, criminals and generally accept these as proper. Fukayama's argument seems almost apologetic in this light. Actually, I don't think it is impossible - or even difficult - to make objective assessments of some of the traits to which Fukayama refers as being the basis for the assignment of rights. Certainly it is becoming much easier.
And on this basis his argument supports an uneven distribution of rights: I picture a world in which, say, the average Sun reader does not have the right to vote - or in which women are more likely to be able to travel freely between states than men. We balk instinctively at such ideas (because of the assumptions mentioned above) - but children, as I say, do not have the right to vote.

Of course, in reality, such a system already exists: rights and freedoms are effectively conferred in unequal measure by one special human ability - the ability to acquire capital.
On a lighter note, for those of you who, like me, are Firefox users if you don't already have 'stumble' it is an amazingly useful add-on: it records your site preferences and throws up sites that may also be of interest (based on similar people's ratings) which, in turn, you rate. The antidote to you-tube.
http://www.stumbleupon.com/

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