I also worked for BP for a number of years, and gained something of an 'insider's' perspective. I wanted to summarise some of the conclusions I have drawn, based on the best climate science we have today and what (as a psychologist) I know of human nature:
- The next decade or so will likely see human catastrophe on a scale that will likely make World Wars 1 & 2 look like a picnic. It is hard to say precisely how this will happen - since that depends largely on climate feedback loops and 'tipping points' - but overall the best metaphor is of someone gradually rocking a small boat more and more, in a heavy sea. Estimates of human impact vary from hundreds of millions to billions of people.
- People assume more predictability in the impact of climate change than the science supports, for example charts which show how 2 or 3 degrees of warming will affect different parts of the world. Such charts overlook feedback loops (for example the release of methane from Siberian swamps) or tipping point effects (e.g. shifts in oceanic currents) or disruptions in the food chain (e.g. the loss of pollinating insects). The current Australian bushfire crisis is illustrative of effects that become possible with only 1 degree of warming, for example.
- Nobody is going to do anything about it until things get really, really bad for them. From a psychological perspective, history reveals humans to be largely reactive rather than proactive (Japan, for example, resisted modernisation until an American gunship literally sailed into their harbour and demanded fealty). This is true at an individual level (people tend to greatly underestimate their pension requirements, for example), and much more so at the level of states. When push comes to shove history shows that friendly states may nevertheless leave their allies to fend for themselves when they are not directly threatened (See Jared Diamond's discussion of Finland for an illustrative example).
- People living in the poorest parts of the world will likely (though not necessarily) be hardest hit, initially. The most plausible scenario seems to be mass migration of refugees, resulting in the rise of extreme nationalism, and militaristic strategies such as wall-building and 'shoot to kill' border defence. In part, the relatively lackadaisical attitude of the developed world seems to be based on the idea that it will hurt their competitors more.
- Once it does seriously impact the developed world, the most probable response will be technology/geo-engineering. For example, using commercial aircraft to distribute sulphur into the upper atmosphere (similar to the effect of volcanic activity) may rapidly cool the planet by blocking out the sun, but at the price of permanently damaging our atmosphere, and untold effects on the ecosystem.
- Alternative energies are not yet sufficiently developed to provide for human energy needs on the scale required to rapidly transition to a low-carbon economy. Regrettably, our best bet for a speedy transition is nuclear (fission) energy - with continued research into solar, wind, wave and fusion alternatives. The HS2 budget would be better spent building nuclear power stations.
- Free market thinking prevents us coming up with a solution today: this is Naomi Klein's central analysis in 'This Changes Everything', and I agree. Globally, the economy is based on competing trade, and the idea that this is a good thing overall. Co-operating on climate change would require abandoning that fundamental principle - and that's not going to happen until it's a matter of life and death (see above).
- We are still operating (organisationally and individually) in denial and defence mode (if you believe the Kubler-Ross change curve, we still have Anger, Bargaining, Depression and Acceptance ahead of us). People and organisations have been reacting by doing little, tokenistic things that give themselves and others the impression that they care whilst not actually making a difference. BP, for example, has invested in alternative energies - but only as a tiny fraction of their investments overall. They are still heavily involved in exploration and development investment. While at BP I sat through exec-level briefings which predicted massive growth in hydrocarbon markets in the coming years - largely as a result of the growth in China's economy. Commercial organisations are still reacting to climate change as if it is a PR challenge and a reputational risk to be managed. 'Camouflage' tactics are now well developed - such as facile tree-planting or carbon-offsetting. Individuals do something similar - recyling plastic or eating less meat for example - which give them a sense that they are doing something, while doing next to nothing to avert the problem (2019 carbon emission levels were higher than any previous year). In part this is because, with the exception listed below, there isn't really anything individuals can do - change of the scale required can only come about as a result of radical, inter-governmental changes in policy (e.g. banning the use of petrol vehicles).
- Climate activism is our slim but best hope. Naomi argues persuasively that, historically-speaking, the kind of change we need has come about as a result of activism - votes for women, racial equality etc. - powerful, visible, popular protest often deemed 'illegal' by the contemporary system. This is why I support Greta Thunberg ahead of the genius who has come up with a biodegradable plastic. Nobody is going to switch to the new plastic unless someone holds a company's feet to the fire - only a government can do that, and governments won't take heed until popular opinion shifts. If, for example, a new Climate Change agreement banned the use of non-biodegradable plastics, those people with bright ideas would be in business. There is a popular, liberal, view that consumers can effect change directly - but this overlook the 'dark matter' of consumers who don't care, and will go for the cheapest, easiest option every time (somewhat analogous to the Trump/Brexit popularity model).
- Most of the people I meet today are the walking dead. They are blissfully unaware of what is coming, cannot comprehend the scale of the disruption they are facing, and will be entirely unprepared when it comes. Having not experienced war or famine first-hand they do not understand the way those things change human behaviour. They would be better off learning how to hunt, skin and prepare wild animals than switching to vegan diets - it is unlikely that they could forage for or grow the components of their vegan diet, for example.
- Paradoxically, the only sane reaction to the situation we find ourselves in would make one look completely insane. This results in a kind of pathological 'theatricality' in which one goes about the house, tidying and preparing dinner, as if the house is not on fire.
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